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Recent research demonstrates the importance of peer firm effects. Graham and Harvey 
(2001) document that many chief financial officers (CFOs) consider peer firms’ financing 
decisions important in making their own financing decisions. Thierry and Fresard (2014) find that 
corporate investments increase with the valuation of peers. This peer effect also exists in decisions 
regarding corporate executive compensation (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen 2008) and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (Francis et al. 2014). This paper contributes to the literature on 
peer effects by examining whether peer firms’ changes in credit ratings affect a focal firm’s 
financing decisions.  
A number of studies demonstrate that credit ratings contain incremental information not 
reflected in firm characteristics (see, e.g., Millon and Thakor (1985); Elton et al. (2001); Boot, 
Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006)).1 This is because credit rating agencies—which specialize in 
gathering and evaluating information—may receive significant private information about the firm 
being assessed, and hence, can provide more reliable measures of a firm’s creditworthiness 
(Kisgen 2006, 2009). A firm’s credit rating downgrade or upgrade can influence other firms in the 
same industry. Two well-known examples of credit rating downgrades include General Motors 
and Ford, both of which had the same BBB- rating as of November 2004; both were later 
downgraded to “junk category” by S&P in May 2005, which generated significant price 
movements in the automotive sector (Acharya, Schaefer, and Zhang 2015).  
                                                          
1 A firm’s credit rating is one of the most important factors affecting corporate debt policies (Graham and Harvey 
2001). Further, firms with a debt credit rating have significantly more leverage (Faulkender and Petersen 2006). A 
credit rating upgrade or downgrade leads to adjustments in stock and bond prices (e.g., Hand, Holthausen, and 
Leftwich (1992); Kliger and Sarig (2000)) and affects the firm’s access to the commercial paper market, disclosure 
requirements, and its third-party relationships (Kisgen 2006). To the extent that different credit rating levels are 
associated with different costs and benefits, a change in a firm’s credit rating may influence its capital structure 
(Kisgen 2006, 2009). 
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Firms with higher credit quality enjoy a lower cost of debt capital than their peers. Thus, we 
posit that firms are likely to consider their peers’ credit rating changes when making financing 
decisions. In this paper, we study several questions. First, do changes in peer firms’ credit ratings 
motivate and affect the financing activities of firms in the same industry? If so, what financing 
actions do these firms take? Second, does this peer firm effect vary with firm characteristics, 
industry competition environments, and economic conditions? To our knowledge, this paper is the 
first to examine the important effects of peer firms’ credit rating changes on a firm’s corporate 
financing. 
Our study offers new insights into corporate financing motives as well as firms’ related 
actions when they observe changes in peer firms’ credit ratings. We focus on the revised outcome 
of a firm’s credit quality assessment relative to its peers, which is a decision made by a third party 
and not by a firm or its peer firms. Therefore, this paper provides a new perspective for the 
literature on peer effects. We argue from the contagion and competition consideration perspectives 
associated with the relative strength or weakness of firms’ credit quality and document strong 
evidence that peer firms’ credit rating changes affect a firm’s financing decisions. Specifically, we 
demonstrate that a firm that has not been downgraded in one year—but has observed its peers 
being downgraded—changes its net debt issuance in the subsequent year.  
We also consider a mechanism by which peer effects are transmitted, which stems from 
firms’ attempts to avoid the contagion effect and gain an advantage from the relative strength in 
the credit market. Several papers develop a link between a firm’s financial distress and industry 
peers’ outcomes. For example, Lang and Stulz (1992) analyze the contagion effect of peer firms’ 
bankruptcy announcements as well as the competition channel that benefits the bankrupt firms’ 
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competitors. Hertzel and Officer (2012) reveal that a firm’s loan pricing is affected by industry-
rival firms’ financial distress, and that loan spreads widen surrounding industry bankruptcy waves. 
Prior studies adopt bankruptcy filings that have much more limited occurrences. For 
example, Lang and Stulz (1992) use 59 bankruptcy filings, and Jorion and Zhang (2007) use 272 
filings as the key right-hand side variable. Our use of credit rating changes, which is a measure of 
changes in default probability, offers two advantages. First, it allows us a larger sample size; our 
sample includes 5,709 credit rating change events, with 3,277 downgrades and 2,432 upgrades. 
Second, credit rating changes provide a more granular variation in credit quality and the probability 
of financial distress. This enables us to observe firm financing changes as peers’ credit quality 
gradually improves or worsens, but not to the point of bankruptcy. 
Importantly, we show that the effect of peer firms’ rating changes is distinct from and 
uncaptured by firms’ mimicking behavior—in which a firm follows its peer firms’ financing 
actions—as advocated by Leary and Roberts (2014). If firms learn from their peers’ financing 
actions, then when a rating change causes a firm to change financing activities, other firms may 
follow suit. All our analyses control for the net debt issuance of the upgraded and downgraded 
peer firms. It is also possible that a common industry shock may cause an overall rating change 
within an industry, which could potentially drive a wave of industry-wide leveraging or 
deleveraging. Thus, we further control for the effect of industry-wide credit rating changes and 
exclude the focal firm’s observation, which essentially controls for the magnitude and direction of 
common shocks. We find that the effect of peer firms’ credit rating downgrades remains strong, 
and thus, our findings indicate a distinct externality effect of peer firms.  
We develop and test our hypotheses on the ways such an externality effect of peer firms’ 
rating upgrades or downgrades may exert its influences on the firm’s financing activities in the 
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next year. We identify firms as peers if they are in the same industry and have an identical credit 
rating in a given year. The rating change effects we analyze pertain to changes in financing in a 
given year of a firm whose peers’ credit ratings were either upgraded or downgraded in the 
previous year, but whose own credit rating remained unchanged.  
We use a sample of U.S. firms over the period 1985-2014 and find strong evidence that peer 
firms’ credit rating downgrades are an important determinant of a firm’s financing decisions. Such 
firms, on average, reduce their net debt issuance by 1.67% relative to total assets. In our sample, 
this translates into an average annual reduction in net debt issuance of 122.8 million dollars, given 
that the sample firms’ average total assets are 7.352 billion dollars. This 1.67% reduction in the 
net debt issuance is economically significant from two perspectives: i) the direction of such firms’ 
financing actions is opposite to the average NDI increase of 2.4% in our sample (Table 3), and ii) 
such firms’ average decrease in NDI is large relative to the average NDI of all our sample firms. 
In contrast, firms witnessing peer firms’ rating upgrades do not exhibit significant changes in their 
NDI.  
We also find that firms reduce their net debt issuance when peer firms’ ratings are 
downgraded, but do not significantly change their equity financing. Moreover, the reduction in 
NDI is primarily due to decreased debt issuance, which in turn, mainly comes from the reduction 
in the long-term debt. The peer effect we document is prevalent across firms and over time. 
Further, the peer effect in reducing net debt issuance is stronger for firms in concentrated industries 
than for those in competitive industries, and is also stronger when the economy is in expansion 
than in recession.  
Moreover, we find that firms in the highest rating levels among investment-grade categories 
(with S&P ratings of AA- or higher) do not react to peer firms’ rating downgrades. These high 
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credit quality firms typically maintain strong financial positions and are more financially flexible, 
which renders them more stable in their financial activities. We also find a significant decrease in 
the net debt issuances among investment-grade firms rated between A+ and A-. This finding is 
important because the majority of credit rating upgrades and downgrades occur to investment-
grade firms (reported in Appendix, Table 1). Furthermore, firms with high speculative grades of 
BB+ and BB—those with credit ratings less than the investment grade threshold—exhibit 
significant decreases in net debt issuances when their peer firms are downgraded.  
Next, we ask the following questions: If a firm’s credit rating is lower than the industry 
average, would the firm be prone to reducing its leverage to improve its rating? How does a below-
average rating exert pressure on the firm when peer firms’ ratings are upgraded or downgraded? 
We first provide evidence of a significant below-average effect, in that an industry’s average credit 
rating in the previous year serves as a reference point for all firms in that industry. When a firm’s 
rating is below this reference point, it tends to reduce its net debt issuance by 5.18%, on average. 
Moreover, the NDI reduction, given peer firms’ rating changes, is distinct from the effect of firms 
having a below-average rating. A firm with downgraded peers reduces its net debt issuance by 
1.76%, even after controlling for the lower-than-average effect.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our ratings data and explains this study’s sample and methodology. Section 4 
discusses summary statistics and reports our main results on the effects of peer firms’ rating 
changes on firms’ financing policies. Section 5 conducts cross-sectional analyses to examine 
whether heterogeneous variations exist in the peer rating effects. Section 6 performs additional 
analyses to determine whether an interplay exists between the peer and below-average credit 
quality effects, and whether the peer effect varies over time. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Hypothesis Development 
Firms with the same credit ratings in the same industry are perceived as having a similar 
credit quality. A credit rating downgrade reflects an increase in a firm’s probability of default, 
which may negatively affect industry peers through two channels. First, the business relations 
channel results in a counterparty risk (e.g., Jarrow and Yu (2001); Jorion and Zhang (2009)). 
Second, when negative shocks emerge, an information channel leads investors to revise their 
required risk premiums for peers, even if these peers have no business relations with the 
downgraded firm. Lang and Stulz (1992) find that negative news announcements of Chapter 11 
filings by bankrupt firms result in declines in stock prices of the firm’s competitors. Similarly, 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997) show that bankruptcy announcements generate a dominant 
contagion effect. 
Jorion and Zhang (2007) also find evidence of contagion effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies, 
while Jorion and Zhang (2009) show a link between a firm’s financial distress and its creditors. A 
firm’s financial distress also negatively impacts its suppliers’ stock prices (Hertzel, Li, Officer, 
and Rodgers 2008). Further, Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (1997) document that peer firm bond-
rating downgrades impact share prices. Thus, we posit that cautious managers will refrain from 
issuing more net debt to safeguard the firm from this contagion effect.  
On the other hand, peer firms’ downgraded credit ratings provide an opportunity for a firm 
to gain competitive advantages over its peers through the former’s higher credit quality, resulting 
in lower discrete costs (Kisgen 2006), better access to the debt market (Hahn 1993), and higher 
market equity value (Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich 1992). In contrast, the downgraded firm 
may experience more difficulty in gaining financing with debt (Kisgen 2006). Grinblatt and 
Titman (2002) and Kisgen (2006) provide compelling discussions on the clientele effect, in that 
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institutional investors often are restricted by statutory constraints and cannot invest in debt 
securities with credit rating levels lower than a certain threshold.  
Lang and Stulz (1992) also consider the competition channel, by which a bankruptcy 
announcement could result in the redistribution of wealth from the bankrupt firm to its competitors. 
Extant theory and empirical evidence do not offer a clear ex-ante direction for firms’ actions when 
a peer firm’s credit rating is downgraded. We posit that the competition effect can potentially drive 
firms to reduce their net debt issuances to maintain higher credit ratings than their downgraded 
competitors. Our arguments as discussed in the development of Hypothesis 4 and our results 
reported in Table 9 indicate that firms in concentrated industries reduce their net debt issuance 
much more aggressively than firms in competitive industries when their peer firms experience 
credit rating downgrades. 
The above evidence, taken together, suggests that, in the light of peer firms’ credit rating 
downgrades, a firm may want to safeguard itself from the contagion effect and seize the benefit 
from the competition effect. Thus, we form and test our first hypothesis that peer firms’ credit 
rating downgrades lead firms to reduce their debt financing.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Peer firms’ credit rating downgrades lead firms to reduce net debt 
issuance. 
Conversely, extant empirical evidence shows that a firm’s credit rating upgrade contains little 
incremental information due to the relatively transparent nature of firms’ positive news. Prior 
studies, in general, do not find a significant market response to bond upgrades (e.g., Holthausen 
and Leftwich (1986); Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992); Goh and Ederington (1993)). The 
evidence suggests that peer firms’ rating upgrades are not perceived as a significant information 
signal. Thus, we posit that peer firms’ credit rating upgrades do not lead to any significant 
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adjustments in financing activities. This leads to our second hypothesis in the form of a null 
hypothesis, as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Peer firms’ credit rating upgrades do not lead firms to change net debt 
issuance. 
Our credit ratings are based on a debt issuer’s rating, which places more weight on long-term 
debt than on short-term debt. Consequently, if a firm wants to maintain its rating level when peer 
firms’ ratings are downgraded, reducing long-term debt would be more effective than reducing 
short-term debt. Additionally, long-term debt-issuance activities are the most relevant to a firm’s 
capital structure (Welch 2004). Therefore, we formulate our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The effect of peer firms’ credit rating downgrades on a firm’s net debt 
reduction mainly works through long-term debt. 
All else being equal, firms in concentrated industries would experience more pressure than 
firms in competitive industries to maintain good credit ratings when peer firms experience rating 
changes. This is due to the relatively smaller number of firms within a concentrated industry, in 
which one or more firms’ rating upgrades (or downgrade) directly results in a competitive 
disadvantage (or advantage) for other firms. Consequently, these firms would reduce their net debt 
issuance more aggressively than firms in competitive industries do.  
Similarly, small firms would also experience more pressure than large firms to maintain good 
existing credit quality when peer firms’ ratings are downgraded. This is because smaller firms are 
more vulnerable, and it is relatively costlier for them to secure finance than for larger firms if they 
lose their existing credit rating status. Badoer and James (2016) report that an issue’s term to 
maturity increases with the issue size.  Hence, small firms would reduce their net debt issuance 
more aggressively than large firms. These discussions lead to our last hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4 (H4): Peer firms’ credit rating downgrades have a more pronounced effect on net 
debt issuance for firms in concentrated industries and small firms. 
Our study is also related to capital structure literature. The implicit assumption of the 
traditional theories, to a large extent, has been that a firm’s leverage is based on considerations of 
its own financing policy, firm and industry characteristics (e.g., Titman (1984); MacKay and 
Phillips (2005)) and market frictions. 2  In the traditional theories, the role of peer firms’ 
characteristics and actions is either unimportant or works through some firm-level factors, or is 
captured by market frictions surrounding the sources of capital. For example, Leary and Roberts 
(2005) demonstrate that adjustment costs dictate the speed at which the corporate capital structure 
responds to leverage shocks. These studies, however, do not consider the between-firm effects 
within the same industry.  
 
3. Sample and Methodology 
3.1 Sample construction 
Our sample covers all firms with a credit rating in Compustat at the beginning of a year over 
the period from 1985—when ratings data first became available in Compustat—to 2014. From the 
Compustat Ratings File, we collect annual data on firm credit ratings issued by Standard and Poor’s 
                                                          
2 The trade-off theory of capital structure argues that a firm’s optimal leverage ratio is determined by trading off 
between the benefits and costs of debt.2 Earlier research considers corporate taxes (Modigliani and Miller 1963), costs 
of financial distress (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977), agency costs and benefits in relation to conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and managers (Harris and Raviv 1990; Stulz 1990), and between equity holders and 
debtholders (e.g., Jensen (1986)). Other studies analyze information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors and posit the signaling effect of debt (Ross 1977; Leland and Pyle 1977; Noe 1988), or propose the pecking-
order theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984; Leary and Roberts 2010). Kisgen (2006, 2009) investigates the 
effect of a firm’s own credit rating on its capital structure. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) show that a firm’s 
capital structure is persistent. Baker and Wurgler (2002) posit that firms time the market when issuing equity. Dittmar 
and Thakor (2007) assert that issuance decisions are driven by what the manager thinks his firm is worth. Other 
research relates product market strategies and industry characteristics to the capital structure. Brander and Lewis 
(1986) show that, due to the limited liability of equity holders, firms choose positive debt levels to pursue aggressive 
output strategies. Maksimovic (1988) derives debt capacity as a function of industry and firm characteristics. 
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(S&P) for all rated firms, as in Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) and Kisgen (2006). Kedia, 
Rajgopal, and Zhou (2017) show that, relative to Moody’s, the S&P’s ratings are less subject to 
conflicts of interest related to the ownership of stable, large shareholders. We use the S&P long-
term domestic issuer credit ratings (Compustat data item SPLTICRM), which reflect the opinion 
of an issuer’s overall creditworthiness. We construct our peer-rating dummy variables by using 
the ratings at the start of a fiscal year. 
S&P issues 22 alphanumeric ratings, listed from the highest creditworthiness category to the 
lowest: AAA, AA+, AA, AA−, A+, A, A−, BBB+, BBB, BBB−, BB+, BB, BB−, B+, B, B−, 
CCC+, CCC, CCC−, CC, C, D, and SD (Selective Default). Firms rated BBB− and above are 
typically considered as investment grade, and those rated below BBB− are speculative grade. For 
the purpose of estimating our regression models, we transform the S&P alphanumeric rating codes 
into ordinal numerical codes (e.g., Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014); Dimitrov, Palia, and Tang 
(2015)). Our numerical transformation assigns a value of 22 to AAA, 21 to AA+, 20 to AA, …, 
and 1 to D and SD. 
We match the ratings data with firm-level annual financial statement data obtained from 
Compustat to arrive at one observation per firm-year. As is common in prior literature on capital 
structure, we exclude from the sample utility firms as they are highly regulated, and financial firms 
because regulations impose specific restrictions, such as the minimum capital requirement for 
banks and investor insurance for insurance firms, on their asset and liability structures. Following 
Kisgen (2006), we repeat our analyses by including utility firms and our results (not shown for 
brevity reasons) remain robust. We exclude firm-years that have missing observations for 
calculating variables for the empirical analyses. The final sample consists of 3,135 firms with 
26,588 firm-year observations, among which 11,584 are classified as investment grade and 15,004 
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as speculative grade. In this study, we refer to investment-grade ratings as all ratings higher than 
or equal to BBB-, and speculative-grade ratings as all ratings lower than or equal to BB+. As 
detailed in the Appendix, Table 1, our sample consists of 5,709 credit rating change events, of 
which 3,277 are downgrades and 2,432 are upgrades. 
 
3.2 Variables used in the firm-level regression 
Our hypotheses predict future financing changes of a firm when peer firms experience credit 
rating changes. We estimate a model for a firm’s financing decisions following its peer firms’ 
rating changes. The measures of a firm’s financing activities are computed for the subsequent 12 
months following the peer credit rating changes. We use net debt issuance (NDI) to capture firms’ 
financing activities that are mainly reflected in cash flow items, rather than the change in the long-
term debt ratio. 3 The main dependent variable, net debt issuance, in the regressions measures net 
long-term debt minus net equity issued each year and is defined as:4 
𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = Δ𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
where Δ𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is long-term debt issuance (Compustat data item DLTISY) minus long-term debt 
reduction (Compustat data item DLTRY) for firm i from year t–1 to t, scaled by total assets in the 
previous year (Compustat item AT). The last letter “Y” in the Compustat data items indicates that 
                                                          
3 Kisgen (2006, footnote 11 on page 1047) gives a detailed explanation on the use of net debt issuance, which we 
quote here: “'For all net issuance measures, I use the direct cash flow variables as opposed to changes in balance 
sheet levels. Balance sheet level changes can include noncash changes, such as accretion of debt that was originally 
issued at a discount, changes from new translated balances of foreign debt due to changes in exchange rates, or 
marking to market hedging instruments that can be included with debt if related to the debt instrument. The cash flow 
statement variables are more direct measures of the specific issuance and reduction decision activity that I try to 
measure.”. 
4 We also use an alternative definition of net debt issuance that includes changes in current debt, according to Kisgen 
(2006), as net debt Δ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡  minus net equity issued each year, where Δ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is long-term debt issuance (Compustat 
data item DLTISY) minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat data item DLTRY) plus changes in current debt 
(Compustat data item DLCCHY) for firm i from year t–1 to t, scaled by total assets in the previous year (Compustat 
item AT). All our results, available upon request, are quantitatively similar, and do not change our conclusions. 
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the variable is year-to-date. Δ𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is sales of common and preferred stocks (Compustat data 
item SSTKY) minus purchases of common and preferred stocks (data item PRSTKCY) for firm i 
from year t–1 to t, scaled by total assets in the previous year. We further separately examine the 
effects on long-term and short-term debt. We define Δ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 as the ratio of the change in short-
term debt (Compustat data item DLCCHY) to total assets in the previous year. 
We construct two dummy variables pertaining to peer firms’ credit rating changes—the peer 
rating upgrade (𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1
𝑃 ) and downgrade (𝐷𝐺𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1
𝑃 )—for each firm at the beginning of each fiscal 
year t. Specifically, the peer upgrade dummy of firm i within industry k in year t–1 takes a value 
of one (𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1
𝑃 = 1) if the firm is not upgraded or downgraded in year t – 1 from year t – 2, and 
if there is one or more same-industry peer firms (indexed by j) with whom firm i shared the same 
credit rating (CR) in year t–2, that are upgraded in year t–1.5,6 Mathematically, we have 
𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1
𝑃 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−2 = 𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−2, 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−2,  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−1 > 𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 ∈ (1,2, … , 𝑙|𝑙 ≥ 1); 
= 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒. 
Likewise, 𝐷𝐺𝑃 takes a value of one if the firm shares the same credit rating with one or more 
peer firms within a particular industry in a specific year, and that these firms are downgraded in 
the subsequent year, and zero otherwise. In the following discussions, we suppress subscripts i, j, 
k and t in the two dummy variables for notational convenience.  
                                                          
5  We further conducted analysis for rating changes of two or more notches. Due to the restricted criteria for 
constructing the peer rating change dummies, the number of firms whose ratings were changed by two or more notches 
in the sample to be eligible for analysis is much limited. As expected, we do not find any significant relation between 
NDI and peer rating changes of two or more notches. 
6 We have also tested various years (one year before, same year, two years after) of financing activities surrounding 
peer-rating changes. For example, the results (available upon request) of the financing effect at time t of peer rating 
changes at time t-2, ie., two years after peer rating changes, show that a peer rating change in a relatively distant past 
is not likely to exert an impact on a firm’s financing activities. The results also show that firms do not have significant 




We illustrate our definition of a peer firm credit rating upgrade with the following example: 
Suppose that there are three firms in the telecom industry, A, B, and C with an identical credit 
rating of AA in the fiscal year 2000. If firms B and C are subsequently upgraded in 2001, but firm 
A maintains the same rating from 2000 to 2001, then the 𝑈𝐺𝑃 dummy for firm A takes a value of 
one in 2001. In contrast, 𝑈𝐺𝑃 takes a value of zero for firms B and C, as these firms are themselves 
upgraded, despite the other firm’s upgrade.  
We control for any possible industry-wide credit rating shocks, if any, by introducing a 
continuous variable INDCRdiff, which captures these shocks’ magnitude and direction, whether 
large or moderate or positive or negative, or no shocks, as defined below: 
INDCRdiff, t-1  is the change in the level of average credit ratings of an industry, excluding own 
firm’s observation, from t–2 to t–1. 
We address the possibility that, after the credit rating change in year t–1, firms follow the 
financing pattern of downgraded and upgraded firms from year t–1 to t. To this end, all our 
regression analyses include two variables UGNDIind,t  and DGNDIind,t defined as follows. By 
construction, these two variables do not include own firm’s observation: 
UGNDIind, t is the average net debt issuance of the upgraded peer firms in an industry from 
year t–1 to year t. 
DGNDIind, t is the average net debt issuance of the downgraded peer firms in an industry from 
year t–1 to year t. 
We also include in our regression specification a set of conventional explanatory variables 
(all lagged by one year), for both firm-level and industry-level, as controls as they have been 
analyzed in many tests and have conventional interpretations.7 These variables include Leverage, 
                                                          
7 Kisgen (2006) shows a significant negative relation between leverage and debt financing. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
show that firm size is one of the crucial determinants of the capital structure. Myers (2001) and Fama and French 
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Size, Liquidity, Profitability, Dividends, REarnings (retained earnings), Tobin’s Q (growth 
opportunities), Tangibility, and NDTS (non-debt tax shields), as defined below. For robustness 
checks, we also use these control variables in year t–2 and our results remain quantitatively similar 
(available upon request). 
Leveragei,t–1 is the ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Compustat data item DLC) and long-
term debt (Compustat data item DLTT) scaled by the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt and 
stockholders’ equity (Compustat data item LSE minus data item LT) for firm i in year t–1.  
Size i,t-1 is the logarithm of sales (Compustat data item SALE) for firm i in year t–1. 
Liquidity i,t–1 is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent (Compustat data item CHE) to total 
assets (Compustat data item AT) for firm i in year t–1.  
Profitabilityi,t–1 is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and 
amortization (Compustat data item EBITDA) to total assets (Compustat data item AT) for firm i 
in year t–1.  
Dividendsi,t–1 is the ratio of dividends (Compustat data item DV) to total assets (Compustat 
data item AT) for firm i in year t–1. 
REarningsi,t–1 is the ratio of retained earnings (Compustat data item RE) to total assets 
(Compustat data item AT) for firm i in year t–1.  
Tobin’s Qi,t–1 is growth options and is defined as the ratio of the total book value of debt plus 
market value of equity (Compustat data item CSHO × data item PRCC) to total assets (Compustat 
data item AT)) for firm i in year t–1.  
                                                          
(2002) demonstrate that profitability is an important factor affecting the capital structure. Growth options (defined as 
Tobin’s Q in our study) and tangibility are variables affecting the leverage ratio in Rajan and Signals (1995). Dividend 
policy and earnings relate to the increase in debt and equity sales (Titman and Wessels  1988). We include liquidity 
(see Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998)) to control for possible impacts on leverage from firms’ cash positions and non-
debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980; Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984). Welch (2004) and MacKay and Phillips 
(2005) show that industry average leverage ratio is an economically important determinant of capital structure. 
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Tangibilityi,t–1 is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat data item PPENT) 
to total assets (Compustat data item AT) for firm i in year t–1. 
NDTSi,t–1 is the non-debt tax shields and is defined as the ratio of deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit (Compustat data item TXDITC) to total assets (Compustat data item AT) for 
firm i in year t–1. 
4. Summary Statistics and Main Regression Results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows firms’ net debt issuance (NDI) patterns across credit rating categories. Over 
time, high credit-quality firms issue more debt than equity, while low-rated firms reduce leverage, 
on average. These patterns suggest that high credit-quality firms are more able to access the debt 
market than low credit-quality firms. This has important implications for our study as we want to 
examine whether firms, and especially investment-grade firms, reduce their net debt issuances 
when peer firms experience credit rating upgrades or downgrades. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 shows the year-by-year percentages of firms in our sample that have experienced 
their industry peers’ credit rating upgrades and downgrades, respectively. The results demonstrate 
the importance of the peer rating effects: the percentage of firms impacted by peer rating upgrades 
ranges from a minimum of 23% of all sample firms in 1986 to 53% in 2013; the percentage of 
firms impacted by peer rating downgrades ranges from 29% in 1992 to 56% in 2001. Note that our 
analyses require one year for observing a change in the peer firm’s credit rating. Thus, Table 2 
reports results up to the year 2013. 
On the other hand, the proportion of firms experiencing peer firm-rating downgrades is 
generally higher than the proportion of upgrades. This pattern begins in 1986 and continues until 
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2009, when it exhibits a noteworthy reversal in 2010 when peer firm upgrades outweigh 
downgrades. This overall pattern coincides with our findings in the Appendix, Table 1, in that the 
number of upgraded firms becomes greater than the number of downgraded firms since 2010, 
which may reflect the economic recovery after the financial crisis. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of variables in this study. Panel A shows summary 
statistics for the whole sample, while Panel B separates the sample into two parts, with one sub-
sample containing investment-grade firms and the other containing speculative-grade firms. On 
firms’ financing activities, Panel A demonstrates that, on average, rated firms issue more debt than 
equity. The average of NDI is 2.4% which means that firms, on average, issue 2.4% more long-
term debt than equity (i.e., ΔLTD – ΔEquity) relative to total assets in the previous year. The 
average change in long-term debt (ΔLTD) is 2.6% and the average change in equity (ΔEquity) is 
0.21%. Firms also tend to have more net increases in long-term debt (ΔLTD) than net increases in 
short-term debt (ΔSTD) (2.6% versus 0.10%). Overall, firms adjust their capital structure through 
the debt market than going through the equity market. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
On average, firms finance 56% of their total assets through debt (Leverage) and are generally 
profitable, with a mean profitability of 13.5%; they also pay dividends equivalent to 1.5% of their 
total assets. In contrast to studies that use samples consisting of all firms collected from Compustat, 
our sample focuses on rated firms that tend to have high leverage (Faulkender and Petersen 2006; 
Kisgen 2006). A significant 34% of firms’ assets are fixed. Standard deviations of most variables, 
however, show considerable cross-sectional variations, which illustrate the differences in firm 
leverage. Therefore, it is necessary to control for firm characteristics when examining the relative 
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importance of peer firms’ credit rating changes in financing activities. The difference in the average 
industry credit rating INDCRdiff ranges from -0.72 to 0.45, indicating swings in industry-wide credit 
rating changes.  
The mean values of both variables UGNDIind and DGNDIind are positive, which shows that 
both upgraded and downgraded industry peers increase net debt issuance in the year following 
their own rating changes. This is important because our findings reported in later sections show 
that the firm observing peer firms’ downgrades reduces its net debt issuances, an opposite result to 
those peer firms that were downgraded.  
Panel B in Table 3 illustrates that investment-grade firms are larger in size than speculative-
grade firms and have lower leverage, higher profitability, higher retained earnings, higher 
dividends, higher growth options as proxied by Tobin’s Q, and higher net debt issuances. These 
differences suggest that lowly rated firms may have less flexibility than highly rated firms do in 
adjusting their debt financing when peer firms’ ratings are changed. In an unreported test, we find 
that firms with a B+ rating or below are more financially constrained than are other speculative-
grade firms. This evidence echoes our finding reported in Table 1, in that high credit-quality firms 
tend to have better access to the debt market than do low credit-quality firms. 
 
4.2. The relation between peer firms’ credit rating changes and net debt issuance: Baseline 
results 
Our hypotheses predict an insignificant relation between debt financing and UGP, and a 
significant, negative relationship between debt financing and DGP. To examine the impacts of peer 
rating upgrades and downgrades on firm financing, we estimate the following model: 
𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1, (1) 
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where NDIi,t, is the net debt issuance of firm i in year t.
8 The peer rating upgrade UGP occurs in 
year t-1 and takes a value of 1 if one or more peer firms experienced upgrades between year t-2 
and year t-1, while the firm itself was not upgraded. Likewise, the peer rating downgrade DGP 
occurs in year t-1 and takes a value of 1 if one or more peer firms experienced downgrades between 
year t-2 and year t-1, while the firm itself was not downgraded.  
We classify our sample firms into 17 industries based on Kenneth French’s industry 
classifications; after excluding utility and financial firms, 15 industries remain. It is important to 
note that our identification of industry peers dictates the number of industries eligible for analysis. 
To be included for analysis, an industry must have a group of firms that share an identical credit 
rating in a year and satisfy the condition that one or more of the firms in the group are either 
upgraded or downgraded in the next year, while others’ ratings remain unchanged.9 The maximum 
number of downgraded sample firms in a peer group is 28, and the maximum number of upgraded 
firms in a peer group is 14. 
In the above regression specification, Xi,t-1 is a set of control variables, including firm-level 
and industry characteristics, which are observable at the end of year t-1. The regression equation 
tests whether the net issuance of debt for a particular firm-year is affected by changes in peer firms’ 
                                                          
8 We perform additional analyses using the changes in the ratio of long-term debt (a balance sheet item) and changes 
in the ratio of total debt, respectively, as dependent variables. Our results are robust when using these measures.  
 
9 We also used a classification of 30 industries. The relevant coefficient estimates show lower magnitudes due to the 
fewer number of firms available and eligible for analysis within an industry, but the overall results remain qualitatively 
similar and do not change our conclusions. Although adopting broader rating categories, instead of using an identical 
rating, would have more firms in an industry peer group while allowing for more detailed industry classification, the 
peer effects we intend to analyze are not precisely addressed. For example, the competition consideration among three 
firms with respective ratings of A-, A and A+ is not straightforward when the firm with an A+ rating is downgraded 
to A. Also, as Kisgen (2006) points out, a rating of A+ is considered differently from a rating of A in terms of discrete 
costs and benefits of ratings. In addition, we used the text-based industry classification based on the fitted Herfindahl 
index of Hoberg and Phillips (2016) to closely identify product market peers. However, this approach often reclassifies 
a firm’s industry from year to year, and hence some of the same-rating peers in one year are moved to a different 
industry next year, which makes our analyses unfeasible. Thus, the classification of industries in our setting is a 




credit ratings in the previous firm-year. The slope coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 capture the effects of any 
adjustments in net debt issuances due to peer rating upgrades and downgrades, respectively. 
Standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the firm and year levels. 
The main results for the effect of peer firms’ credit rating downgrades (DGP) as reported in 
Columns 1 through 4 in Table 4 are significant, both economically and statistically, and are robust 
to controls for industry characteristics. Column 1 reports that peer firms’ credit rating downgrades 
(DGP) significantly and negatively impact firm financing, having controlled for the change in 
average credit ratings in the industry (INDCRdiff) and the effect of net debt issuance (UGNDIind and 
DGNDIind) of those upgraded and downgraded peer firms.  
Further controlling for firm-level characteristics, Column 2 reveals that firms witnessing peer 
rating downgrades reduce more debt than equity, of approximately 1.63% (t-stat = −4.78) to total 
assets. This finding supports our first hypothesis. In line with the prediction of our second 
hypothesis, we do not find that peer firms’ credit rating upgrades (UGP) significantly impact firm 
financing, even after controlling for firm-level and industry characteristics. Since the regression 
coefficients on UGP are all insignificant in the remaining tests, we mainly discuss the results for 
DGP.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In addition to the firm-level controls noted in Column 2, Column 3 in Table 4 further controls 
for other industry-level characteristics: the industry averages of leverage, size, liquidity, 
profitability, dividends, growth options, tangibility, and NDTS (non-debt tax shields), where 
industry averages are calculated for each fiscal year (lagged by one year, which is the year when 
peer firms’ ratings changed) for each variable. We find that the effect of peer firm downgrades on 
leverage becomes even stronger (coeff. = –1.67; t-stat = –4.85). Column 4 adds the GDP growth 
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rate, which we obtain from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/). We 
find that peer firm downgrade effects on leverage become even stronger (coeff. = –1.78; t-stat = –
5.76). Overall, the results reported in Table 4 are consistent with both Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
4.3. The relation between peer firms’ credit rating changes and adjustments in debt and equity  
We more closely examine financing adjustments by evaluating the decisions to increase (or 
decrease) debt and equity in the year following peer firms’ credit rating upgrades and downgrades. 
Table 5 presents the results. Coefficient estimates for the firm-level and industry-level controls in 
Tables 5 to Table 11 are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. We find that firms 
are more likely to reduce NDI after their peer firms’ credit ratings are downgraded.  
As shown in Columns 1 and 2, we find that peer firms’ credit rating downgrades affect the 
change in long-term debt (ΔLTDi,t), but no significant changes occur in short-term debt (ΔSTDi,t). 
In Column 2, the coefficient estimate on DGP is −1.59 (t-stat = −4.72), which shows that, when 
peer firms’ credit ratings were downgraded, firms reduce their long-term debt by 1.59% to total 
assets. Column 3 shows that firms do not significantly change their equity when peer firms were 
downgraded. The changes in debt and equity components as shown in Columns 4 through 7 suggest 
that the coefficient on DGP observed in Column 1 is mainly attributable to the reduction in long-
term debt issuances (-2.32% with a t-stat = −5.43 in Column 4) following rating downgrades of 
peer firms. Note that although the UGP dummy shows statistical significance for both long-term 
debt issuances and long-term debt reductions (Columns 4 and 5, respectively), the combined effect 
as reflected in the changes in long-term debt (ΔLTDi,t) in Column 2 is statistically insignificant.  
Our finding—that firms primarily reduce their long-term rather than short-term debt 
following peer firms’ rating downgrades—implies that reducing long-term debt is likely a more 
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effective strategy to maintain good credit ratings. This firm behavior is consistent with ratings 
agencies’ evaluation practices. In summary, the results in Table 5 are consistent with Hypothesis 
3. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5. Cross-firm Variation in the Peer-Firm Effect 
5.1. The relation between peer firms’ credit rating changes and net debt issuances: Investment- 
versus speculative-grade firms  
In this section we examine whether investment- and speculative-grade firms respond 
differently to peer firms’ credit rating changes. To this end, we first introduce two explanatory 
variables into the regressions: the credit rating level (Rating) and the investment grade status (IG). 
Specifically, the variable Rating is the numerical value of credit rating (22 for AAA, 21 for AA+…, 
etc.) of a firm in the previous year. The dummy variable IG equals one if a firm’s credit rating is 
investment-grade in the previous year, and zero otherwise. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 report the results. In Column 1, the positive coefficient on Rating 
indicates that the higher the rating a firm receives, the more net debt the firm issues. In Column 2, 
the dummy variable IG has a highly significant and positive coefficient, which indicates that 
investment-grade firms issue 4.89% more net debt than non-investment-grade firms. These results 
are consistent with those reported in Table 1 and Panel B in Table 3. In Columns 1 and 2, the 
coefficients on DGP are −1.83 (t-stat = −5.37) and −1.69 (t-stat = −4.99), respectively. These 
findings indicate that firms reduce NDI when peer firms’ credit ratings were downgraded in the 




[Insert Table 6 here] 
Furthermore, we separately estimate the regression for investment and speculative-grade 
firms. The coefficients on DGP in Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 show that, following rating 
downgrades of peer firms, speculative- and investment-grade firms reduce their net debt issuances 
by 1.83% (t-stat = −3.50) and 1.56% (t-stat = −4.18), respectively. In general, we find that NDI 
reduction triggered by peer firms’ credit rating downgrades is prevalent across both speculative- 
and investment-grade firms.  
In Column 5, we further interact the IG dummy with the UGP dummy and the DGP dummy 
in the regressions. Consistent with our results reported earlier, we find that firms reduce NDI when 
their peer firms’ credit ratings were downgraded in the previous year, but we do not find a peer 
rating upgrade effect on NDI. The results also show that the IG dummy has a positive coefficient 
of 5.37%, consistent with the result in Column 2. The interaction term IG×UGP is negative and 
statistically significant, which indicates that, given that peer firms were upgraded, the positive NDI 
of being an investment-grade firm (5.37%) decreases by 1.61%. In contrast, the interaction term 
IG×DGP is statistically insignificant, showing that, when peer firms were downgraded, no 
significant difference in NDI exists between investment- and speculative-grade firms. 
 
5.2. Firms in various credit rating categories 
In this section, we look into detailed rating categories to analyze the effect of peer firms’ 
credit rating changes. In order to test the difference between the NDI responses of different rating 
categories, we construct four dummy variables: AA takes a value of one if a firm’s credit rating is 
greater than or equal to AA-, and zero otherwise; A takes a value of one if a firm’s credit rating is 
between A+ and A-, and zero otherwise; BBB takes a value of one if a firm’s credit rating is BBB 
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or BBB-, and zero otherwise; and BB takes a value of one if a firm’s credit rating is BB+ or BB, 
and zero otherwise. We then combine these dummy variables with the dummy variables for peer 
rating upgrades and downgrades, UGP and DGP, to analyze the peer rating changes’ effects on NDI 
.  
Table 7 reports the results. As shown in Column 1, firms, on average, reduce net debt issuance 
by 1.47% (t-stat = −3.38) of total assets when their peer firms were downgraded, but do not 
significantly respond to peer upgrades. The AA rating category exhibits a positive and significant 
difference in NDI of 5.11%, which indicates that these firms have a distinctively higher NDI. 
However, the additional effects of peer upgrades and downgrades as captured by the interaction 
terms of AA×UGP and AA×DGP are not statistically significant, which indicates that these firms 
are insensitive to peer rating changes due to strong financial position. These findings are consistent 
with the evidence of Kisgen (2006), Tang (2009), and Badoer and James (2016), in that top-rated 
firms enjoy financial flexibility and access to external finance. The A rating category also has a 
distinctively higher NDI. The additional effect of peer upgrades A×UGP on NDI is statistically 
significant, and the additional effect of peer downgrades AA×DGP is marginally significant. These 
results indicate that these firms appear to be sensitive to peer rating changes and respond by 
reducing NDI.  
Column 2 further considers the BBB rating category and shows that, although on average, 
these firms exhibit a slightly higher NDI, they are not sensitive to peer rating changes. In line with 
results in Column 1, the A rating category exhibits a reduction in NDI in response to peer upgrades, 
while the top AA rating category exhibits an insignificant response to peer upgrades or 
downgrades. Column 3 adds a dummy variable for the BB rating category. The coefficient of 
BB×DGP shows that these firms additionally reduce net debt issuance by 1.44% of total assets 
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when their peer firms were downgraded, but do not significantly respond to peer upgrades. The 
results suggest that these higher-rated, speculative-grade firms are alert to their peers’ rating 
downgrades. As these may adversely impact their credit standing and access to external financial 
markets, such firms may subsequently act to reduce their net debt issuances. The pattern of results 
for all other rating categories remains unchanged. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5.3. The relation between peer firms’ credit rating changes and net debt issuance: Large versus 
small firms 
We now analyze whether peer firms’ rating changes affect large or small firms differently. 
We classify a firm in each year as a large (small) firm if its total assets are greater (less) than the 
median value of the total assets of firms in its industry. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 show the results 
for the full sample. We find that both small and large firms respond strongly and negatively to their 
peer firms’ rating downgrades. Small firms reduce net debt issuance by 2.16% (t-stat = −3.67), 
while large firms reduce NDI by 1.50% (t-stat = −3.97).  
We further classify firm size separately for investment- and speculative-grade firms. 
Columns 5 and 6 show that investment-grade large-size firms tend to significantly reduce NDI in 
the year after their peers have experienced credit rating downgrades. These results point toward the 
reputational concerns of large investment-grade firms. Columns 3 and 4 report that among 
speculative-grade ratings, only small firms significantly reduce net debt issuance in the year after 
their peers’ credit rating downgrades. These results imply that small size firms with speculative-
grade ratings, those who typically have greater financial constraints and are subject to relatively 
costlier external financing, have more serious concerns about peers’ credit rating downgrades.  
 
25 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
5.4. The peer firm effect: Firms in competitive versus concentrated industries 
Next, we analyze whether peer firms’ credit rating changes differently affect firms in 
competitive versus concentrated industries. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based 
on sales as a measure of industry competitiveness. We classify firms as operating in competitive 
(concentrated) industries if the HHI index is below (above) the 33rd (67th) percentile of the index 
value. Table 9 reports the results. Columns 1 and 2 are based on the percentiles computed over the 
entire sample, while Columns 3 and 4 are based on those in individual years.  
Overall, the results indicate that firms in concentrated industries reduce their net debt issuance 
much more aggressively than firms in competitive industries when peer firms experience credit 
rating downgrades. For example, when the classification of firms operating in competitive versus 
concentrated industries is based on the entire sample (Column 1), firms operating in competitive 
industries reduce their net debt issuance by only 1.02% for DGp, which is statistically insignificant. 
In contrast, firms in concentrated industries (Column 2) reduce their net debt issuances by 1.71%, 
which is statistically significant (t-stat = −3.33).  
The pattern of results in Columns 3 and 4 is also strong when the classification of firms is 
based on the HHI index value in individual years. The corresponding reductions are 1.61% (t-stat 
= −3.13) for firms in concentrated industries (Column 4) and 1.22% (t-stat = −1.79) for firms in 
competitive industries (Column 3). Overall, the results in Table 9 are consistent with the prediction 
of Hypothesis 4, and support the argument that a firm’s rating downgrade benefits its rivals—as a 
concentrated industry contains relatively fewer firms—in line with the competition channel 
outlined by Lang and Stulz (1992). 
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[Insert Table 9 here] 
6. Further Analyses 
6.1. Industry-average rating, peers’ rating changes, and the capital structure 
In this section we address the questions of whether and how an industry’s average credit 
rating affects a firm’s financing in relation to peer firms’ credit rating changes. To this end, we first 
compute the average industry rating in each year and then compare this with the firm’s credit rating. 
We then construct a dummy variable (CR < IND), which takes a value of one if the firm’s rating 
is lower than the industry’s average credit rating, and zero otherwise. We then include this dummy 
variable in our regression analysis. 
Table 10 reports the results. Column 1 shows that on average, firms reduce net debt by 4.59% 
(t-stat = −5.86) if their credit rating in the previous year is lower than the industry average (i.e., the 
dummy variable (CR<IND) = 1). This finding suggests a ‘lower-than-average effect’, in which an 
industry’s average credit rating provides a reference point for a firm. When the firm’s credit rating 
is lower than this reference point, it tends to reduce its net debt issuance.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Moreover, Column 2 in Table 10 shows that when peer firms are downgraded, the firm 
reduces its net debt issuance by 1.71% (t-stat = −4.94) after controlling for the lower-than-average 
credit quality effect. This lower-than-average effect remains strong and statistically significant: the 
coefficient on (CR<IND) is equal to −4.59 (t-stat = −5.87). On the other hand, the effect of peer 
firms’ credit rating upgrades is statistically insignificant. We also consider the interaction terms 
between the lower-than-average effect and the peer rating effect. Column 3 in Table 10 shows that 
the interaction term between CR<IND and UGP is positive and statistically significant.  
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Column 4 shows that, speculative-grade firms take significant actions to reduce net debt 
issuance when their credit quality is lower than average (coefficient on (CR<IND) = −3.98 with t-
stat = −4.06) and when peer firms are downgraded (coefficient on DGP = −1.83 with t-stat = −3.48). 
As Column 5 indicates, investment-grade firms exhibit a strong reduction in their net debt issuance 
with a coefficient of −1.57 (t-stat = −4.19) on DGP. However, we find that the effect of lower-
than-average credit quality is statistically insignificant for investment-grade firms. This suggests 
that the downgrades to peer firms bring down the industry average, which lessens this particular 
industry pressure, while the fact that peer firms are downgraded does prompt the firm to reduce its 
net debt issuance. 
 
6.2. Time-series patterns: Financial crises and business cycles 
Finally, we analyze whether firms in different economic environments react differently to 
peer firms’ credit rating changes, and especially during financial crisis periods. Our results 
presented in the Appendix, Table 1, suggest that the effect of peer firms’ credit rating changes may 
vary over time due to the occurrences of major historical events. We construct a ‘Crisis’ dummy 
variable that equals one if the year is 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise. Our results reported in 
Table 11 remain consistent. Column 1 shows that firms reduce net debt issuance following peer 
firms’ rating downgrades, but not following upgrades. The Crisis dummy is negative and 
significant. However, Column 2 shows that the interaction terms of Crisis with UGP and DGP do 
not show significant effects on NDI. These findings indicate that firms significantly reduced their 
net debt issuances during crisis periods, such that the marginal effect of peer rating changes is 
limited. Note that the negative and statistically significant coefficients on DGP in Columns 1 and 
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2 indicate that outside the financial crisis period, rating downgrades of peer firms exert influences 
on net debt issuance.  
We further verify whether our results are driven by common macroeconomic factors that 
could potentially affect both market-wide credit rating changes and the cost of external financing, 
resulting in changes in firm deleveraging. We follow McLean and Zhao (2014) and define a 
recession year as a year in which six months or more were in recession as classified by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Only three years in our sample period from 1985 to 2014 satisfy 
the recession criteria: 2001, 2008, and 2009. We construct a ‘Recession’ dummy variable that 
equals one if the year is 2001, 2008, or 2009, and zero otherwise. As shown in Columns 3 and 4, 
our main finding here is that peer rating downgrades exert an externality effect on a firm’s financing 
through its NDI. Similar to what we find for the crisis period, the Recession dummy is negative 
and significant, and the interaction terms do not show significant effects on NDI. Overall, these 
results suggest that the additional effect of peer rating changes appears subdued when the external 
financing costs are higher or firms experience more difficulty in accessing external capital markets 
during recession years or periods of financial crisis. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we provide evidence that industry peers’ credit rating changes influence firms’ 
financing activities. All our evidence shows that peer firms’ credit rating downgrades create strong 
externalities for firms in the same industry. In particular, firms embark on significant reductions in 
net long-term debt issuance. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that firms are 
mindful of each other’s adversity. When peers are downgraded, which suggests potential 
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contagions or opportunities to gain competitive advantages, firms vigilantly manage financing 
activities in a precautious manner by reducing net debt issuance. 
Further, we find that firms at the top end of the investment-grade do not change financing 
activities when peer firms’ ratings changed. Instead, firms with A ratings exhibit significant effects 
when their peer firms were downgraded. Additionally, firms at the top end of the speculative-grade 
threshold, that is, those near the investment-grade boundary—exhibit particularly strong reductions 
in net debt issuance when their peers were downgraded. The peer effects we document are not only 
ubiquitous among investment- and speculative-grade firms, but also prevalent over time. However, 
we do observe cross-sectional variation in the peer effect. The peer effect is stronger for firms 
operating in more concentrated industries and in times of economic expansion or outside financial 
crises. 
Moreover, we also document a distinct and significant lower-than-average credit quality 
effect. That is, firms substantially reduce net debt issuance when their credit ratings are lower than 
the industry’s average credit rating. Importantly, the peer rating effect remains strong and 
statistically significant, even after controlling for the lower-than-average credit quality effect. Our 
findings highlight the significance of the interactions among firms and how these interactions can 
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Table 1. Net debt issuance across credit ratings  
 
This table shows the mean values of net debt issuance (NDI) across credit ratings in the sample. The sample of rated 
firms is from Compustat for 1985–2014 where credit ratings are as of the beginning of each year.  
 
 AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- 
No. of Firm-Years 421 148 583 565 1,090 1,715 1,209 
Net Debt Issuance (NDI) 2.62% 2.39% 3.05% 3.66% 4.09% 3.84% 4.27% 
        
 BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ 
No. of Firm-Years 1,652 2,284 1,917 1,484 2,226 2,991 3,644 
Net Debt Issuance (NDI) 4.20% 3.70% 2.72% 2.80% 2.32% 2.59% 1.86% 
 B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC & Below 
No. of Firm-Years 2,156 1,086 481 268 124 544 





Table 2. Percentage of firms affected by peer upgrades and downgrades over the sample year 
 
The table shows the percentage of firms affected by peer upgrades and downgrades over the sample period. Peer upgrades and 
downgrades occur when one or more peer firms (one or multiple firms with the same rating within the same industry in the same 
year) are upgraded or downgraded in the next year. 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Peer Upgrades 22.93% 36.08% 32.15% 40.05% 25.35% 29.55% 28.92% 29.16% 37.12% 39.52% 
Peer Downgrades 36.42% 43.64% 49.00% 38.11% 45.35% 39.90% 28.92% 34.54% 30.63% 34.51% 
Total Firms 626 887 913 889 868 811 781 809 873 893 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Peer Upgrades 33.12% 44.78% 40.69% 30.16% 39.59% 33.89% 28.53% 39.14% 35.02% 41.33% 
Peer Downgrades 34.95% 38.16% 43.07% 51.63% 52.49% 55.93% 47.05% 52.01% 48.66% 48.46% 
Total Firms 940 982 1,026 1,091 1,147 1,153 1,141 1,141 1,106 1,059 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
  
Peer Upgrades 39.84% 41.62% 38.27% 33.15% 45.15% 44.71% 43.78% 53.13% 
  
Peer Downgrades 44.40% 42.56% 42.81% 44.96% 30.81% 34.68% 42.11% 34.79% 
  






Table 3. Summary statistics of variables 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in regressions. The sample is from 
Compustat for the period 1985–2014 and excludes financial and utility firms. NDI (=ΔLTD – 
ΔEquity) is the change in long-term debt minus the change in equity, scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of each year. ΔLTD is long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction scaled 
by total assets. Debt Issuance is long-term debt issuance, Debt Reduction is long-term debt 
reduction, ΔEquity is sales of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common and 
preferred stock scaled by a firm’s total assets. Equity Issuance is sales of common and preferred 
stock, Equity Reduction is purchases of common and preferred stock, all normalized by total 
assets. ΔSTD is the change in current debt scaled by total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum 
of short-term debt and long-term debt to the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and 
stockholders’ equity. Size is the logarithm of sales. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalent to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, 
and amortization to total assets. Dividends are the ratio of dividends to total assets. REarnings are 
the ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of debt plus 
the market value of equity to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment 
to total assets. NDTS is the ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets. GDP 
is the annual growth rate of US GDP. Panel A shows summary statistics, while Panel B shows the 
mean values of the variables used in the regressions classifying firms as either investment- or 
speculative-grade in the previous year. **, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 5th %tile 95th %tile 
NDI 0.024 0.195 -0.148 0.246 
ΔLTD 0.026 0.173 -0.114 0.220 
ΔEquity 0.002 0.108 -0.083 0.079 
Debt Issuance 0.162 0.335 0.000 0.702 
Debt Reduction 0.135 0.271 0.000 0.559 
Equity Issuance 0.020 0.081 0.000 0.096 
Equity Reduction 0.021 0.064 0.000 0.104 
ΔSTD 0.001 0.070 -0.069 0.071 
Leverage 0.560 2.185 0.117 1.258 
Size 7.430 1.569 4.931 10.027 
Liquidity 0.083 0.110 0.003 0.297 
Profitability 0.135 0.094 0.019 0.265 
Dividends 0.015 0.052 0.000 0.053 
REarnings 0.085 0.636 -0.589 0.595 
Tobin’s Q 1.347 1.759 0.535 2.946 
Tangibility 0.340 0.228 0.044 0.789 
NDTS 0.033 0.041 0.000 0.119 
INDCRdiff -0.080 0.433 -0.724 0.452 

























(Speculative – Investment) 
NDI 0.018 0.040 -0.022*** 
ΔLTD 0.022 0.024 -0.002 
ΔEquity 0.014 -0.019 0.033*** 
Debt Issuance 0.210 0.099 0.110*** 
Debt Reduction 0.182 0.073 0.109*** 
Equity Issuance 0.026 0.012 0.014*** 
Equity Reduction 0.013 0.032 -0.019*** 
ΔSTD 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
Leverage 0.676 0.406 0.270*** 
Size 6.690 8.407 -1.716*** 
Liquidity 0.088 0.077 0.083*** 
Profitability 0.115 0.160 -0.045*** 
Dividends 0.011 0.022 -0.011*** 
REarnings -0.100 0.328 -0.428*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.161 1.553 -0.391*** 
Tangibility 0.338 0.342 -0.004 
NDTS 0.027 0.041 -0.014*** 
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Table 4. Relation between peer firms’ rating changes and net debt issuance: Baseline results 
 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression on net debt issuance (in %) with t-statistics in the 
parentheses. UGP and DGP are binary variables which take the value 1 if there are one or more peer upgrades or 
downgrades, (i.e., one or more firms with the same rating within the same industry in the same year that are 
upgraded or downgraded in the next year). INDCRdiff is the change in the level of average credit ratings of an 
industry, excluding own firm’s observation. UGNDIind and DGNDIind are the yearly average Net Debt Issuance 
(NDI) of the upgraded and downgraded peer firms, respectively. The detailed definitions of other control variables 
are described in Table 3. Standard errors are two-way-clustered at the firm and year levels. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 


































Firm Fixed Effects 
































































































































































Table 5. Relation between peer firms’ rating changes and corporate financing components  
 
This table shows the regression coefficients and t-statistics in the parentheses on the change in current debt (Column 1), the change in 
long-term debt (Column 2) the change in equity (Column 3), long-term debt issuance (Column 4), long-term debt reduction (Column 
5), equity issuance (Column 6), and equity reduction (Column 7), with all variables measured in %. UGP and DGP are binary variables 
which take the value 1 if there are one or more peer upgrades or downgrades, (i.e., one or more firms with the same rating within the 
same industry in the same year that are upgraded or downgraded in the next year). INDCRdiff is the change in the level of average credit 
ratings of an industry, excluding own firm’s observation. UGNDIind and DGNDIind are the yearly average Net Debt Issuance (NDI) of 
the upgraded and downgraded peer firms, respectively. The detailed definitions of other control variables are described in Table 3. 











































Firm Fixed Effects 














































































































































Table 6. Relation between peer firms’ rating changes and net debt issuance: Investment- versus speculative-grade firms 
 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression on net debt issuance (in %) for the full sample and for investment-
grade and speculative-grade firms separately. UGP and DGP are binary variables which take the value 1 if there are one or more peer 
upgrades or downgrades, (i.e., one or more firms with the same rating within the same industry in the same year that are upgraded or 
downgraded in the next year). Rating is a numerical bond rating with AAA = 22… and D/SD = 1. IG is a dummy variable that equals 
1 for investment-grade firms and zero otherwise. INDCRdiff is the change in the level of average credit ratings of an industry, excluding 
own firm’s observation. UGNDIind and DGNDIind are the yearly average Net Debt Issuance (NDI) of the upgraded and downgraded 
peer firms, respectively. The detailed definitions of other control variables are described in Table 3. Standard errors are two-way-
clustered at the firm and year levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 







































Firm Fixed Effects 
















































































































































Table 7. Relation between peer firms’ rating changes and net debt issuance: Various credit 
rating categories 
 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression on net debt issuance (in %) for firms 
near the bottom end of investment grade or the top end of speculative grade. UGP and DGP are 
binary variables which take the value 1 if there are one or more peer upgrades or downgrades, (i.e., 
one or more firms with the same rating within the same industry in the same year that are upgraded 
or downgraded in the next year). INDCRdiff is the change in the level of average credit ratings of an 
industry, excluding own firm’s observation. UGNDIind and DGNDIind are the yearly average Net 
Debt Issuance (NDI) of the upgraded and downgraded peer firms, respectively. The detailed 
definitions of other control variables are described in Table 3. Standard errors are two-way clustered 
at the firm and year levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
































Firm Fixed Effects 
























































































































Table 8. Relation between peer firms’ rating changes and net debt issuance: Small versus large firms 
 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression on net debt issuance (in %) partitioned by firm size (using 
yearly industry median) for the full sample and for firms classified as investment-grade firms and speculative-grade firms by 
S&P separately.  UGP and DGP are binary variables which take the value 1 if there are one or more peer upgrades or 
downgrades, (i.e., one or more firms with the same rating within the same industry in the same year that are upgraded or 
downgraded in the next year). INDCRdiff is the change in the level of average credit ratings of an industry, excluding own 
firm’s observation. UGNDIind and DGNDIind are the yearly average Net Debt Issuance (NDI) of the upgraded and downgraded 
peer firms, respectively. The detailed definitions of other control variables are described in Table 3. Standard errors are two-
way clustered at the firm and year levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
































Firm Fixed Effects 






























































































































Table 9. Relation between peer firms’ rating changes and net debt issuance: Competitive versus concentrated industries 
 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression on net debt issuance (in %) partitioned by market competition. We 
use the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (or HHI) based on sales as our measure of competitiveness in an industry. We classify firms 
as operating in competitive (concentrated) industries if the HHI index is below (above) the 33rd (67th) percentile. UGP and DGP 
are binary variables which take the value 1 if there are one or more peer upgrades or downgrades, (i.e., one or more firms with 
the same rating within the same industry in the same year that are upgraded or downgraded in the next year). The detailed 
definitions of control variables are described in Table 3. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm- and year-levels. The 
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Firm Fixed Effects 






















































































Table 10. Industry-average credit ratings, peer rating changes, and net debt issuance 
 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression on net debt issuance (in %) for the full sample and for 
investment-grade and speculative-grade firms separately after controlling for average industry ratings. (CR<IND) is a 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm’s credit rating is less than the industry average in a particular year. UGP 
and DGP are binary variables which take the value 1 if there are one or more peer upgrades or downgrades, (i.e., one or 
more firms with the same rating within the same industry in the same year that are upgraded or downgraded in the next 
year). The detailed definitions of control variables are described in Table 3. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the 
firm and year levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
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Firm Fixed Effects 




































































































































Table 11. Relation between peer firms’ rating changes and net debt issuance: Financial 
crises and business cycles 
 
This table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression on net debt issuance (in %) for 
different states of the economy: financial crisis (defined as years 2008 and 2009) and for 
expansion and recession periods separately. UGP and DGP are binary variables which take 
the value 1 if there are one or more peer upgrades or downgrades, (i.e., one or more firms 
with the same rating within the same industry in the same year that are upgraded or 
downgraded in the next year). The detailed definitions of control variables are described in 
Table 3. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and year levels. The t-statistics are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Appendix Table 1 
 
In Appendix Table 1 we report the yearly total number of credit rating upgrades and downgrades as well as the 
distribution of credit rating changes across two categories of firms: investment- and speculative-grade firms. We 
observe some interesting patterns. First, the majority of credit rating upgrades and downgrades occur in investment-
grade firms. Second, the number of credit rating downgrades surged in 2001 and 2002, and increased sharply in 2008 
and 2009, which are likely due to the dot-com bubble burst in the year 2000 and the recent global financial crisis over 
the period 2007-2009. Third, the proportion of speculative-grade firms that are downgraded varies over time, and 
increases toward the later part of our sample period, with a noticeable jump in 1999 and reaching more than 55% of 
all downgrades in 2011. Finally, the proportion of investment-grade firms that are upgraded stood at a high of nearly 
76% in 1986, but dropped to a historical low of approximately 41% in 2004 and approximately 43% in 2010, which 
is then followed by a gradual recovery to reach a new high of 80% in 2014. 
 
Distribution of upgrades and downgrades across years 
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Upgrades 0 29 68 69 78 55 68 82 92 64 
  Investment  75.86% 64.71% 63.77% 67.95% 61.82% 61.76% 53.66% 56.52% 76.56% 
  Speculative  24.14% 35.29% 36.23% 32.05% 38.18% 38.24% 46.34% 43.48% 23.44% 
            
Downgrades 0 117 108 99 80 102 102 64 62 58 
  Investment  77.78% 75.93% 70.71% 67.50% 63.73% 60.78% 65.63% 79.03% 79.31% 
  Speculative  22.22% 24.07% 29.29% 32.50% 36.27% 39.22% 34.38% 20.97% 20.69% 
           
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Upgrades 105 82 93 105 52 62 64 58 91 102 
  Investment 68.57% 68.29% 67.74% 64.76% 63.46% 69.35% 57.81% 50.00% 59.34% 41.18% 
  Speculative 31.43% 31.71% 32.26% 35.24% 36.54% 30.65% 42.19% 50.00% 40.66% 58.82% 
           
Downgrades 82 83 75 107 158 176 219 217 173 125 
  Investment 71.95% 69.88% 68.00% 77.57% 62.03% 72.73% 67.12% 61.29% 65.90% 68.00% 
  Speculative 28.05% 30.12% 32.00% 22.43% 37.97% 27.27% 32.88% 38.71% 34.10% 32.00% 
           
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Upgrades 97 92 106 95 64 175 149 109 116 10 
  Investment 62.89% 57.61% 48.11% 61.05% 48.44% 42.86% 56.38% 58.72% 61.21% 80.00% 
  Speculative 37.11% 42.39% 51.89% 38.95% 51.56% 57.14% 43.62% 41.28% 38.79% 20.00% 
           
Downgrades 156 149 131 171 185 64 67 79 65 3 
  Investment 66.03% 58.39% 71.76% 59.06% 56.22% 68.75% 44.78% 63.29% 52.31% 66.67% 
  Speculative 33.97% 41.61% 28.24% 40.94% 43.78% 31.25% 55.22% 36.71% 47.69% 33.33% 
 
 
